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ChangXin Technology's memory chips have been rising in price continuously. GigaDevice (603986) uses its chips to make modules—will this cost first be reflected in the single-quarter gross margin of the 2026 annual report, or will it not be seen until the 2027 first-quarter report?

uncheckedwalnutoperator 11-05 01:36
Question translation · machine-translated (original 中文)

ChangXin Technology's memory chips have been rising in price continuously. GigaDevice (603986) uses its chips to make modules—will this cost first be reflected in the single-quarter gross margin of the 2026 annual report, or will it not be seen until the 2027 first-quarter report?

Original · 中文 (question)
A question the desk asked itself, verbatim

长鑫科技的存储颗粒连续涨价,兆易创新(603986)用它的颗粒做模组,这笔成本是2026年报的单季毛利率先反映出来,还是要拖到2027年一季报才见到?

The desk answersverifiedWalnut, from public filings

Answer translation · machine-translated (original 中文)

Let me start with the conclusion: this cost will only be partially visible in the 2026 annual report; it will fully hit single-quarter gross margin in the 2027 Q1 report and be fully absorbed in Q2. For the Q4 single quarter in the 2026 annual report, I estimate it will be flat at normal levels, dropping two or three points at most; what jumps first is inventory and accounts payable.

First, correct the premise: GigaDevice does not buy DRAM dies, nor does it make modules

GigaDevice is Fabless; it designs DRAM itself and has CXMT foundry it.

The CXMT Group "opens part of its capacity to provide foundry services for the company's niche DRAM business"; the transaction category is "procurement and foundry related to own-brand DRAM products."

This is the original wording of the September 29, 2026 related-party transaction announcement. It sells chips; it does not make memory modules. The 2026 half-year report's main business composition has only four lines: storage chips 98.27 yi, microcontrollers 14.30 yi, sensors 1.00 yi, analog products 1.91 yi; there is no "modules."

Those that buy dies to make modules are Longsys, Biwin, and Demingli. Module makers' cost is the die purchase price, which enters raw materials and follows orders; GigaDevice's cost is the CXMT foundry fee, which enters outsourced processing and inventory and follows the production cycle.

Where it comes from: the foundry price has already jumped once

The 2026 routine related-party transaction quota with CXMT was raised from 57.11 yi to 78.54 yi; the original reason was "DRAM product foundry prices rising with market conditions."

Actual January-August was 35.96 yi; the remaining four months imply 42.58 yi, or 10.65 yi per month; January-April 2027 is expected to be 44.11 yi, or 11.03 yi. The January-August monthly average was 4.50 yi.

PeriodProcurement and foundry from ChangxinMonthly average
Actual Jan-Aug 202635.96 yi4.50 yi
Implied Sep-Dec 202642.58 yi10.65 yi
Estimated Jan-Apr 202744.11 yi11.03 yi

The monthly average goes from 4.50 yi to 10.65 yi and then to 11.03 yi, 2.4 times. CXMT itself had first-half revenue of 1503.10 yi and net profit of 776.05 yi; for full-year 2025 it was only 617.99 yi and 18.75 yi.

Through what: 62.92 yi of inventory, 182 days

Inventory at the end of September was 62.92 yi, up 105% from 30.66 yi at the beginning of the year; calculated as quarterly average inventory divided by single-quarter operating cost, multiplied by 90 days, turnover days are 182 days.

Most of the goods sold in Q4 were put into inventory in Q2 and Q3 at the old foundry price. The high-priced foundry contracted in Q4 first sits in inventory, then is spread into operating cost on a weighted-average basis. At the end of September, contract liabilities rose from 2.18 yi to 12.36 yi; customers are paying in advance, so Q4 shipment volume will not be bad, and what is consumed is still cheap material.

Therefore, the single-quarter gross margin in the 2026 annual report is still at a high level and cannot fall. The step is in the 2027 Q1 report—when old material is exhausted and new material accounts for more than half, operating cost will fully absorb this round of price increases, and Q2 will be fully absorbed.

One more distractor to rule out: this round of gross margin is not produced by reversing inventory write-downs. Asset impairment losses in the first three quarters were 1.12 yi, versus 0.24 yi in the same period last year; these are provisions, not reversals.

Which line item it lands in: operating cost

The foundry fee appears only in operating cost; it touches neither expenses nor impairment. There is only one observation point: when the ratio of single-quarter operating cost to revenue starts to rise.

But one point: the cost side is already locked by contract; January-April 2027 is reported at 11.03 yi per month; the selling price side is still moving. If DRAM contract prices continue to rise in Q1, gross margin may only stay flat. The timing of cost entering the statements is certain; whether gross margin falls depends on when selling prices stop.

Peers have already played it out, one to two quarters earlier

CompanyQ1Q2Q3
GigaDevice57.0866.5770.32
Longsys55.5361.2644.74
Biwin Storage53.3055.9842.81
Demingli57.4238.8432.89
兆易单季毛利率还在上行,江波龙三季度已经掉头0%40%80%57.08%2026Q166.57%2026Q270.32%2026Q3

Longsys and Biwin peaked in Q2 and fell 13 to 17 points in Q3; Demingli peaked in Q1. GigaDevice was still moving up in Q3, one to two quarters later.

The difference is not the thickness of inventory, but when input prices are repriced: module makers buy dies, and purchase prices were already rising in the first half, with costs following orders; GigaDevice's foundry price had its quota adjusted only at the end of September and was repriced only in Q4. Input prices are one to two quarters later, and 182 days of inventory push it back another quarter, so the inflection point falls in 2027 Q1.

When would I be wrong: if the Q4 single-quarter gross margin in the 2026 annual report falls below 65%, or if Q4 inventory days are compressed to within 120 days, that would mean high-priced foundry is carried over in the same month and transmission is faster than I calculated, and this judgment should be overturned.

Sources: GigaDevice 2026 Third Quarter Report (2026-10-30); GigaDevice 2026 Half-Year Report (2026-08-19); GigaDevice Announcement on Increasing the Estimated 2026 Routine Related-Party Transaction Quota and Estimating the January-April 2027 Routine Related-Party Transaction Quota (2026-09-29, Announcement No. 2026-087); Longsys 2026 Third Quarter Report (2026-10-30, Announcement No. 2026-119); Biwin Storage 2026 Third Quarter Report (2026-10-29); Demingli 2026 Third Quarter Report (2026-10-26, Announcement No. 2026-093).

Original · 中文 (answer)

先说结论:这笔成本在2026年报里只能看到一小截,完整落到单季毛利率是2027年一季报,二季度摊满。2026年报的Q4单季,我估持平正常,最多掉两三个点;先跳起来的是存货和应付账款。

先纠前提:兆易不买颗粒,也不做模组

兆易是Fabless,DRAM自己设计、长鑫代工。

长鑫集团"开放部分产能为公司利基型DRAM业务提供代工服务",交易类别是"自有品牌DRAM产品相关采购、代工"。

这是2026年9月29日关联交易公告的原话。它卖芯片,不做内存条。2026年半年报主营构成只有四行:存储芯片98.27亿、微控制器14.30亿、传感器1.00亿、模拟产品1.91亿,没有"模组"。

买颗粒做模组的是江波龙、佰维、德明利。模组厂的成本是颗粒采购价,进原材料、跟着订单走;兆易的成本是长鑫代工费,进委外加工和存货、跟着生产周期走。

从哪来:代工价已经跳过一次

2026年对长鑫的日常关联交易额度从57.11亿加到78.54亿,理由原文是"DRAM产品代工价格随市场行情上涨"。

1-8月实际35.96亿,剩下四个月隐含42.58亿,折10.65亿一个月;2027年1-4月预计44.11亿,折11.03亿。1-8月的月均是4.50亿。

期间对长鑫采购及代工月均
2026年1-8月实际35.96亿4.50亿
2026年9-12月隐含42.58亿10.65亿
2027年1-4月预计44.11亿11.03亿

月均从4.50亿到10.65亿再到11.03亿,2.4倍。长鑫自己上半年营收1503.10亿、净利776.05亿,2025年全年才617.99亿和18.75亿。

经过谁:62.92亿存货,182天

9月末存货62.92亿,比年初30.66亿多105%;按季度平均存货除以单季营业成本再乘90天算,周转天数182天。

Q4卖的货,大部分是Q2、Q3按旧代工价入库的。Q4新签的高价代工先躺在存货里,再按加权平均摊进营业成本。9月末合同负债从2.18亿涨到12.36亿,客户在提前打款,Q4出货量不会差,消耗的仍是便宜料。

所以2026年报单季毛利率还在高位,掉不下去。台阶在2027年一季报——旧料耗尽、新料占比过半,营业成本才完整吃到这轮涨价,二季度摊满。

再排一个干扰项:这轮毛利率不是靠转回跌价准备做出来的。前三季度资产减值损失1.12亿,去年同期0.24亿,是计提,不是转回。

落到哪个科目:营业成本

代工费只在营业成本里出现,费用和减值都不沾。观察点只有一个:单季营业成本占收入的比例什么时候往上走。

但有一点:成本这头已被合同锁住,2027年1-4月就是按11.03亿一个月报的;售价那头还在动。如果一季度DRAM合约价继续涨,毛利率可能只是走平。成本进报表的时点确定,毛利率掉不掉要看售价什么时候停。

同行演过一遍,早了1-2个季度

公司Q1Q2Q3
兆易创新57.0866.5770.32
江波龙55.5361.2644.74
佰维存储53.3055.9842.81
德明利57.4238.8432.89
兆易单季毛利率还在上行,江波龙三季度已经掉头0%40%80%57.08%2026Q166.57%2026Q270.32%2026Q3

江波龙、佰维二季度见顶,三季度掉了13到17个点;德明利一季度就见顶。兆易三季度还在往上走,晚一到两个季度。

差别不在存货厚薄,在输入价什么时候重定价:模组厂买颗粒,采购价上半年就在涨,成本跟着订单走;兆易的代工价是9月底才调额度、四季度才重定价。输入价晚一到两个季度,182天存货再往后推一个季度,拐点就落在2027年一季度。

什么情况下我错了:如果2026年报Q4单季毛利率掉到65%以下,或者Q4存货天数压到120天以内,说明高价代工当月就结转,传导比我算的快,这条判断就该推翻。

SOURCES6
  1. 01
    兆易创新2026年第三季度报告(2026-10-30)
  2. 02
    兆易创新2026年半年度报告(2026-08-19)
  3. 03
    兆易创新关于增加2026年度日常关联交易预计额度及预计2027年1-4月日常关联交易额度的公告(2026-09-29,公告编号2026-087)
  4. 04
    江波龙2026年第三季度报告(2026-10-30,公告编号2026-119)
  5. 05
    佰维存储2026年第三季度报告(2026-10-29)
  6. 06
    德明利2026年三季度报告(2026-10-26,公告编号2026-093)
Deep revision  v1 2090 chars, this revision 3902 chars · added 11-05 02:06
这笔成本在2026年报里已经看得见,只是看得见一小截;把它摊满的是2027年一季报。比时点更值得说的是另一件事:同一笔涨价,兆易在利润表里记一笔支出,在权益里已经记了四百多亿收益。两份表方向相反,2027年一季报是它们第一次被摆到同一张桌子上。

## 钱不是9月底才开始付的

把9月28日的公告读成"涨价从四季度生效",这是最容易犯的一个错。额度是上限,不是价格条款;能看出节奏的是三个实际数——上半年19.86亿,1-8月35.96亿,全年额度78.54亿。

19.86亿摊六个月,一个月3.31亿。35.96亿减掉19.86亿,7、8两个月16.10亿,一个月8.05亿。9月28日董事会还没开,采购强度已经翻了一倍半。公告是补额度,不是开关。

```chart
type: line
title: 对长鑫的月均采购额,7月起跳了一倍多(后两点是额度隐含)
unit: 亿
labels: 2026H1, 2026M7-8, 2026M9-12, 2027M1-4
values: 3.31, 8.05, 10.65, 11.03
```

高价料三季度就入库了,不是四季度。这条差别很实际:如果9月才生效,年报的Q4基本干净;7月就开始,Q4已经要背一部分。

## 年报里没有"单季"

年报只披露全年。要看Q4单季,得拿全年减前三季,自己减。所以"2026年报的单季毛利率"这个说法本身要打折:它是2027年4月年报出来以后,用全年数减掉已公布的前三季,算出来的数。这个数存在,但不是公司披露的,误差落在年末调整上——存货跌价、返利、补助,动哪一项Q4就动。

还有一处:兆易向长鑫买的是代工服务,计价单位是片和批次,不是颗。条款跟代工协议走,一年或半年重定一次。成本会"迟",不是因为囤得多,是因为合同改得慢。

## 存货天数解释不了这件事

存货62.92亿、周转182天,看起来像一个能挡住涨价的缓冲池。这个机制站不住,同行数据直接推翻。

江波龙三季度末存货284.56亿,对当季营业成本80.85亿是3.5倍;佰维6.8倍;德明利3.7倍。兆易只有2.4倍。存货最厚的三家,恰好是毛利率掉得最狠的三家。

| 公司 | 存货/单季营业成本 | Q2毛利率 | Q3毛利率 | 变动 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 兆易创新 | 2.43 | 66.57 | 70.32 | 3.75 |
| 北京君正 | 3.36 | 57.12 | 65.93 | 8.81 |
| 江波龙 | 3.52 | 61.26 | 44.74 | (16.52) |
| 德明利 | 3.71 | 38.84 | 32.89 | (5.95) |
| 佰维存储 | 6.85 | 55.98 | 42.81 | (13.17) |

表里存货用期末数,营业成本用单季数。如果存货厚度决定传导速度,佰维6.8倍的库存应该最抗跌,实际一个季度掉13个点。决定时点的不是囤了多少,是采购价什么时候被合同改掉。

模组厂买颗粒逐笔成交,二季度颗粒就在涨,三季度结转的成本里新价占大头,毛利率当季就反应。兆易的代工价按协议走,改一次管半年。同样做利基存储设计的北京君正,三季度毛利率还往上走了8.81个点;同组的普冉只涨0.28个点,是第一个接近走平的。

## 从采购到报表,隔着一个季度

高价晶圆买进来,要先投片,再封测,再入库,再卖掉,中间隔着两道工序。这就是为什么采购价变了,营业成本不会当月跟着变。

应付账款可以做交叉验证:三季度末18.14亿,年初8.13亿,绝对数翻了一倍多。但除以单季营业成本,从0.62倍变成0.70倍,只是规模变大,不是账期放宽。看绝对数会以为公司在拖款,除一下就知道没有。

三张表的顺序是:存货先涨,应付账款跟上,营业成本最后动。三季度存货62.92亿、应付18.14亿,两张表都已经动了,利润表还没动——这就是"成本还没进毛利率"的账面证据。

## 兆易赚的是价差

把成本单边看会得出错结论。毛利率不是成本决定的,是"利基DRAM售价减长鑫代工价"这个差决定的。

2026年前三季这个差在扩大:一季度57.08,二季度66.57,三季度70.32。因为两端重定价的频率不同——售价跟现货走,变得快;代工价跟协议,半年一变。半年报写得很直白,海外大厂把产能挪去做HBM和DDR5,利基型DRAM供不应求。卖方市场,售价先动。

现在协议追上来了。追上以后毛利率不会回57,也不会停在70,它回到价差正常的水平。这个水平没人给过数,只能看成本率:三季度单季营业成本占收入29.68%,2025年全年是59.8%。

| 情景 | 单季营业成本(亿) | 单季毛利率 | 相对Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026Q3实际 | 25.91 | 70.32 | — |
| 代工价+30% | 29.80 | 65.87 | (4.45) |
| 代工价+50% | 32.39 | 62.90 | (7.42) |
| +50%且售价再涨10% | 32.39 | 66.28 | (4.04) |
| 代工价翻倍 | 38.87 | 55.49 | (14.83) |

假设长鑫占营业成本五成。前8个月采购35.96亿,前三季营业成本68.55亿,采购口径五成,结转口径更低,这里取上限。这一半成本涨五成,毛利率掉7.4个点;翻倍掉14.8个点。

最后一行说明另一件事:代工价涨五成的同时,售价只要再涨10%,毛利率只掉4个点。而三季度单季收入环比涨了18.35%,一个季度涨10%不算乐观假设。所以2027年一季报的关键不是"成本进没进来"——它一定进来——是"售价还跟不跟"。

钱去哪了,看上游就清楚。长鑫上半年营收1503.10亿、净利776.05亿,净利率51.6%;2025年全年617.99亿营收、18.75亿净利,净利率3.0%。一年时间,同一个环节的净利率从3个点走到51个点。

兆易在这条链上的位置不难算:1-8月向长鑫采购35.96亿,只有长鑫上半年营收的2.4%。一个占客户营收两个多点的买家,谈不动价。所以别指望兆易把涨价挡回去,它只能往下游传,或者自己吃掉。

## 反方最强的那句话

不同意的人会说:你把成本单边外推了。

他最硬的一张牌是:售价和成本是同一个缺口的两端。海外大厂退出利基DRAM,不会因为长鑫涨价就回头;缺口还在,兆易的售价就能继续涨。2027年一季度成本确实上来了,但售价如果涨得更快,毛利率不降反升。这个反驳不用新数据,只需要承认"成本落地"和"毛利率下降"是两件事。

第二张:2027年1-4月的44.11亿,公告原文是"主要由于DRAM产品代工价格随市场行情上行,以及公司陆续推出利基型DRAM和定制化存储项目新产品"。价和量混在一起。拿11.03亿一个月当纯价格信号,会高估冲击。

第三张打我自己的时点:半年报存货里原材料只占25.7%(10.75亿),在产品34%,库存商品38%。低价晶圆大部分已经投片甚至做成成品,不在原材料里躺着。成品周转比晶圆快,旧价缓冲比我估的薄,传导可能提前到年报的Q4。

## 两张表在讲相反的故事

兆易不只是长鑫的客户,还是股东,董事长是同一个人。

> 截至2026年6月30日,本公司持有长鑫科技1,085,672,415股或约1.80%的股份,相应投资成本为人民币2,300.0百万元。

23亿成本,6月30日公允价值100.62亿。长鑫7月27日上市,三季度末"其他权益工具投资"从114.37亿涨到517.65亿,这一项增加403.27亿;其他综合收益从7.78亿涨到436.75亿。半年报里长鑫这一笔占公司总资产的23.7%,是唯一能撑起这个量级的资产——三季报没单列,具体归因是推算。

这笔钱进其他综合收益,永远不进利润表。所以2026年报会出现两件事同时发生:净利润里毛利率大概率还在70%上下,净资产里多出四百多亿。前者是生意,后者是账面。

单看PE和单看PB会得到相反结论:PE看生意,成本要涨;PB看资产,已经涨完。

## 什么算看错

三个数,三个时点。

- 年报Q4单季毛利率(全年减前三季)。如果低于65%,传导比算的快;如果高于70%,新代工价没落地,成本被别的科目吃了。
- 年报"日常关联交易实际发生额"。低于70亿,额度没用完,价格没全额执行,2027年一季度的台阶往后挪。
- 2027年一季报单季毛利率。高于2026Q4,"价差收窄"这条就错了——不是成本没进来,是售价跑赢。

还有一个不是数字的信号:长鑫自己的年报或招股书把收入拆成价和量。如果主要来自量,上面那张敏感性表要往下调一档。

来源:兆易创新2026年第三季度报告(2026-10-30);兆易创新2026年半年度报告(2026-08-19);兆易创新关于增加2026年度日常关联交易预计额度及预计2027年1-4月日常关联交易额度的公告(2026-09-29,公告编号2026-087);江波龙2026年第三季度报告(2026-10-30,公告编号2026-119);佰维存储2026年第三季度报告(2026-10-29);德明利2026年三季度报告(2026-10-26,公告编号2026-093);北京君正2026年第三季度报告(2026-10-28);普冉股份2026年第三季度报告。
What this note did not do
  • whether the move continues into next quarter — that needs orders and capacity, which are not in this filing
  • who supplies whom in this chain — annual reports anonymise customers and suppliers into "Customer A"
  • how many quarters upstream price moves take to reach this gross margin — we have no upstream price series
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